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GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES IN PARTNERSHIP-BASED FUNDING APPLICATIONS FOR INDONESIA'S SMALLHOLDER OIL PALM REPLANTING PROGRAMME: EVIDENCE FROM KUD BINA TANI SEJAHTERA

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ABSTRACT

Indonesia's Smallholder Oil Palm Replanting Programme (Program Peremajaan Sawit Rakyat—PSR) represents one of the government's strategic interventions to improve the productivity and sustainability of smallholder oil palm plantations. Despite substantial public funding and institutional support, the programme has consistently failed to achieve its national implementation targets. Previous studies have primarily focused on land legality, partnership schemes, or programme implementation separately, while limited attention has been devoted to the governance of funding applications as a critical stage determining programme success. This study aims to analyse the governance challenges that hinder partnership-based PSR funding applications, identify the institutional and administrative constraints contributing to proposal stagnation, and formulate an improved governance model for the funding application process. A qualitative case study was conducted at KUD Bina Tani Sejahtera in partnership with PT Sawindo Kencana, Bangka Belitung Province. Data were collected through in-depth interviews, field observations, focus group discussions, and document analysis, and analysed using the interactive model of data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing. The findings reveal that prolonged proposal stagnation is primarily caused by five interrelated governance dimensions, namely unresolved land legality, fragmented administrative databases, delays in land documentation, limited institutional capacity of cooperatives, and weak inter-agency coordination. These conditions create a recurring resubmission cycle that substantially increases administrative burden and delays programme implementation. The study proposes an integrated governance framework that combines cross-agency digital verification, institutional capacity strengthening, harmonised regulatory coordination, and administrative readiness enhancement to improve the effectiveness, transparency, and accountability of PSR implementation. The proposed framework contributes to the literature on collaborative governance and public programme implementation in agricultural development by explaining how administrative complexity and institutional interaction influence access to public funding.

Keywords: *Collaborative Governance, Oil Palm Replanting, Public Programme Implementation, Administrative Burden, Institutional Capacity, Partnership Governance.*

INTRODUCTION

Indonesia is the world's largest producer of crude palm oil (CPO), with smallholder plantations accounting for approximately 41% of the national oil palm cultivated area (Directorate General of Estate Crops, 2025). Despite their dominant contribution to plantation area, the productivity of smallholder plantations remains considerably lower than that of private estates because a substantial proportion of plantations have exceeded their productive economic life (Corley & Tinker, 2016; Woittiez et al., 2017; FAO, 2024). As a result, increasing productivity through systematic replanting has become one of the Indonesian government's strategic priorities to enhance competitiveness and ensure the long-term sustainability of the national palm oil industry (Petri et al., 2024).

To address this issue, the Government of Indonesia introduced the Smallholder Oil Palm Replanting Programme (Program Peremajaan Sawit Rakyat—PSR), which provides financial assistance, technical support, and institutional facilitation for eligible smallholders (BPDPKS, 2024). Since its implementation in 2017, the programme has become one of the largest public interventions in the plantation sector. However, despite increasing the financial incentive to IDR 60 million per hectare, programme implementation has remained substantially below the national target. By 2024, only around 368 thousand hectares had been replanted compared with the cumulative target of more than 1.4 million hectares (BPDPKS, 2024; Directorate General of Estate Crops, 2025). These figures indicate that the availability of public funding alone is insufficient to ensure successful policy implementation.

Previous studies have shown that the principal barriers to PSR implementation are increasingly associated with governance rather than financial constraints. Weak institutional coordination, fragmented administrative systems, land legality issues, and overlapping authorities among government agencies have become persistent obstacles throughout the funding application process (Halimatussadiah et al., 2020; FORTASBI, 2024; Hutasuhut et al., 2023). Similarly, Petri et al. (2024) identified unresolved land legality as one of the major structural barriers limiting smallholders' access to the programme, while Reich and Musshoff (2025) highlighted that institutional collaboration significantly influences programme effectiveness.

Among these governance challenges, the funding application stage represents one of the most critical yet underexplored phases of programme implementation. Although the government has allocated sufficient funding, proposals cannot proceed unless every administrative, legal, technical, and institutional requirement has been successfully verified by multiple agencies. Consequently, deficiencies occurring during the application process directly determine whether public resources ultimately reach eligible beneficiaries (Edwards III, 1980; Grindle, 1980).

The experience of KUD Bina Tani Sejahtera, in partnership with PT Sawindo Kencana, illustrates these governance challenges. Since submitting its PSR proposal in 2017, the cooperative has experienced prolonged delays caused by unresolved land legality, inconsistencies between Simluhtan and population databases, incomplete land documentation, limited institutional capacity, and weak coordination among implementing agencies. These interrelated constraints have repeatedly forced proposal revisions, creating a prolonged administrative bottleneck that has delayed programme implementation for several years (BPDPKS, 2024).

Existing literature has generally examined PSR from separate perspectives, including land legality (Petri et al., 2024), institutional partnerships (Hutasuhut et al., 2023), programme implementation (Halimatussadiah et al., 2020), and collaborative governance (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). However, few studies conceptualise the funding application mechanism itself as a governance process involving interactions among legal compliance, institutional capacity, administrative integration, and multi-actor coordination. Consequently, the governance dynamics responsible for repeated proposal revisions and prolonged verification remain insufficiently explained.

This study addresses that research gap by positioning the PSR funding application mechanism as a collaborative governance system rather than merely an administrative procedure. Specifically, this research analyses how land legality, administrative integration, institutional capacity, and inter-organisational coordination interact to influence funding application outcomes. Through an in-depth qualitative case study, this research proposes an integrated governance model capable of improving the effectiveness, transparency, and accountability of partnership-based PSR implementation.

The novelty of this study is threefold. First, it reconceptualises the PSR funding application mechanism as a collaborative governance process involving multiple public and private institutions (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). Second, it introduces the concept of the PSR Resubmission Cycle, explaining how repeated administrative revisions create cumulative institutional inefficiencies and administrative burden (Moynihan et al., 2015). Third, it proposes an integrated governance framework combining cross-agency digital verification, institutional capacity strengthening, administrative readiness, and regulatory harmonisation to improve public programme implementation.

Literature Review

Collaborative Governance In Public Programme Implementation

The implementation of public policies increasingly requires collaboration among multiple stakeholders rather than relying solely on government agencies. This governance approach, commonly referred to as collaborative governance, emphasises collective decision-making involving public institutions, private organisations, civil society, and other relevant actors in addressing complex policy issues (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Collaborative governance becomes particularly important when policy implementation depends on shared resources, information exchange, and coordinated responsibilities across institutional boundaries.

Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) further explain that collaborative governance consists of three interconnected dimensions, namely principled engagement, shared motivation, and capacity for joint action. These dimensions determine whether different organisations are able to coordinate effectively in achieving common policy objectives. In the context of Indonesia's Smallholder Oil Palm Replanting Programme (PSR), the funding application process involves various stakeholders, including cooperatives, plantation companies, local governments, the Directorate General of Estate Crops, BPDPKS, the National Land Agency (ATR/BPN), forestry authorities, banking institutions, and independent surveyors. Consequently, programme success depends not only on regulatory compliance but also on the effectiveness of institutional collaboration among these actors (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015).

However, collaborative governance frequently encounters institutional fragmentation when organisational responsibilities overlap and communication mechanisms are not fully integrated. Such fragmentation often results in prolonged administrative procedures, inconsistent policy interpretation, and duplicated verification processes (Bryson et al., 2015). These governance failures have become increasingly evident in agricultural development programmes involving multiple implementing institutions.

Policy Implementation Theory

Policy implementation represents the stage at which government decisions are translated into practical actions. According to Edwards III (1980), successful policy implementation is determined by four primary variables: communication, resources, disposition, and bureaucratic structure. Weaknesses in any of these dimensions may reduce programme effectiveness despite the availability of sufficient financial resources.

Similarly, Grindle (1980) argues that policy outcomes are influenced not only by policy content but also by the institutional context in which implementation occurs. Administrative capacity, political commitment, organisational coordination, and stakeholder participation collectively determine whether policy objectives can be achieved. Therefore, implementation failure should not simply be interpreted as poor compliance but rather as a consequence of institutional interactions within the implementation environment.

Within the PSR programme, the funding application mechanism functions as an implementation process requiring cooperation among multiple institutions. Although comprehensive regulations governing funding applications have been established, practical implementation frequently encounters administrative inconsistencies, legal uncertainty, and coordination problems that delay proposal approval (BPDPKS, 2024; Halimatussadiah et al., 2020).

Administrative Burden Theory

Administrative Burden Theory explains how government administrative procedures may unintentionally reduce citizens' access to public services. Moynihan, Herd, and Harvey (2015) classify administrative burden into three major dimensions, namely learning costs, compliance costs, and psychological costs.

Learning costs refer to the effort required to understand programme requirements, compliance costs relate to fulfilling administrative obligations, while psychological costs emerge from repeated procedural uncertainty and bureaucratic complexity (Moynihan et al., 2015).

In agricultural subsidy programmes, excessive administrative burden may discourage eligible beneficiaries from participating despite the availability of financial support (Herd & Moynihan, 2018). Within the PSR programme, administrative burden becomes evident through repeated document revisions, inconsistencies among institutional databases, prolonged verification procedures, and multiple administrative corrections. These conditions increase transaction costs for cooperatives and smallholders while simultaneously delaying programme implementation.

The concept of administrative burden is therefore highly relevant for explaining why many PSR funding applications experience repeated revisions despite fulfilling most technical requirements.

Institutional Capacity

Institutional capacity refers to an organisation's ability to mobilise resources, coordinate activities, manage information, and achieve intended objectives effectively (UNDP, 2009). Institutional capacity encompasses human resources, organisational management, technological capability, leadership, and organisational learning.

In cooperative-based agricultural development programmes, institutional capacity determines the quality of administrative preparation, document management, digital data processing, and coordination with government agencies (Halimatussadiah et al., 2020). Weak institutional capacity often results in incomplete documentation, inconsistent databases, delayed verification, and limited adaptability to evolving regulatory requirements.

Previous studies indicate that strengthening institutional capacity significantly improves programme implementation, particularly when policy execution involves multiple stakeholders and complex administrative procedures (Bryson et al., 2015; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015).

Previous Studies And Research Gap

Previous research concerning Indonesia's Smallholder Oil Palm Replanting Programme has predominantly examined individual aspects of programme implementation. Halimatussadiah et al. (2020) emphasised institutional coordination as a key determinant of programme effectiveness. Hutasuhut et al. (2023) highlighted the strategic role of partnership arrangements between plantation companies and smallholders. Petri et al. (2024) focused primarily on land legality as the principal constraint affecting programme accessibility, whereas Reich and Musshoff (2025) investigated institutional collaboration in improving smallholder participation.

Despite these valuable contributions, previous studies generally analyse governance variables separately. Limited attention has been devoted to understanding how land legality, administrative integration, institutional capacity, document readiness, and multi-actor coordination interact simultaneously throughout the funding application process. Furthermore, no previous study has explicitly conceptualised repeated proposal revisions as a governance phenomenon generating cumulative administrative burden and implementation delays.

Accordingly, this study addresses these gaps by proposing an integrated governance perspective that explains proposal stagnation through the interaction of institutional, administrative, and governance factors. Unlike previous studies, this research introduces the concept of the PSR Resubmission Cycle as a governance mechanism explaining how repeated proposal revisions contribute to prolonged implementation delays.

Theoretical Contribution

Drawing upon Collaborative Governance Theory (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015), Policy Implementation Theory (Edwards III, 1980; Grindle, 1980), Administrative Burden Theory (Moynihan et al., 2015), and Institutional Capacity Theory (UNDP, 2009), this study develops an integrated analytical framework for examining governance challenges in partnership-based PSR funding applications.

Unlike previous studies that examined land legality, institutional partnerships, or programme implementation separately, this study integrates these dimensions into a single governance framework to explain why funding applications repeatedly experience prolonged verification and administrative revisions.

The study proposes that proposal stagnation is not merely the consequence of incomplete documentation but rather the outcome of interactions among five governance dimensions, namely land legality, administrative data integration, document readiness, institutional capacity, and multi-actor coordination. These governance dimensions collectively influence administrative effectiveness and determine the success of partnership-based PSR funding applications.

Furthermore, this research introduces the concept of the PSR Resubmission Cycle, which explains how repeated proposal revisions generate cumulative administrative burden, increase verification time, reduce institutional efficiency, and ultimately delay programme implementation. This concept extends the Administrative Burden Theory by demonstrating how repetitive bureaucratic verification processes create systemic inefficiencies within collaborative governance arrangements.

Accordingly, this study contributes to the literature on public programme implementation by offering an integrated governance model that combines collaborative governance, policy implementation, institutional capacity, and administrative burden into a comprehensive analytical framework for understanding agricultural funding accessibility in developing countries.

REASEARCH METHODS

This study employed a qualitative research approach using a descriptive case study design to investigate governance challenges encountered during the funding application process of Indonesia's Smallholder Oil Palm Replanting Programme (PSR). A case study approach was selected because it enables an in-depth understanding of complex governance interactions occurring within a real-life institutional context (Yin, 2018). Rather than examining programme outcomes quantitatively, this research explored how multiple stakeholders interacted throughout the proposal submission and verification process.

The research focused on KUD Bina Tani Sejahtera, Tempilang Village, Tempilang District, West Bangka Regency, Bangka Belitung Islands Province. The cooperative was selected because its partnership-based PSR proposal experienced repeated administrative revisions over several years despite complying with the general programme requirements. This case therefore provides valuable insights into governance barriers affecting programme implementation.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Governance Challenges In Partnership-Based PSR Funding Applications

The findings indicate that the prolonged delay in the PSR funding application was not attributable to a single administrative issue. Instead, proposal stagnation resulted from the interaction of multiple governance dimensions involving legal, administrative, institutional, and inter-organisational factors. These dimensions collectively created repeated proposal revisions and significantly prolonged the verification process.

The thematic analysis identified five major governance dimensions influencing proposal approval, namely land legality, administrative data integration, document readiness, institutional capacity, and multi-actor coordination.

Table 3. Major Governance Challenges Identified During the PSR Funding Application Process

Governance Dimension	Main Findings	Sources of Evidence
Land legality	Land ownership documents remained administratively incomplete	Interviews, Documents
Administrative integration	Simluhtan data were inconsistent with population records	Interviews, Observation
Document readiness	Proposal documents required repeated revisions	Interviews, Documents
Institutional capacity	Limited administrative capability of cooperative personnel	Interviews, FGD
Multi-actor coordination	Weak communication among implementing agencies	Interviews, Observation

Source: Authors' fieldwork.

The results demonstrate that land legality constituted the most fundamental obstacle throughout the funding application process. Although cooperative members had cultivated the land for many years, several parcels had not yet fulfilled the legal and administrative requirements stipulated under the PSR programme. Consequently, proposal verification could not proceed before land ownership status was fully validated by the relevant authorities. Similar findings have been reported by Petri et al. (2024), who identified land legality as one of the primary barriers preventing smallholders from accessing replanting assistance.

Furthermore, administrative verification revealed inconsistencies between the Simluhtan database, population administration records, and land ownership documentation. Such inconsistencies required repeated document correction before proposals could advance to the next verification stage. This finding indicates that digital administrative integration remains insufficient despite ongoing government digitalisation initiatives.

Land Legality As The Primary Governance Constraint

Land legality emerged as the most dominant governance challenge identified during the study. Interviews consistently revealed that incomplete ownership documentation delayed proposal verification despite farmers' long-term occupation of the plantation areas.

Table 4. Findings on Land Legality Issues

Evidence	Main Findings
Interview with Cooperative Chairman	Administrative legality remains incomplete
Cooperative Members	Land certificates require updating
ATR/BPN	Verification process requires document synchronisation
PT Sawindo Kencana	Partnership support depends on legal compliance

The findings demonstrate that legal ownership was insufficient unless supported by complete administrative documentation. Several respondents explained that land parcels required additional verification because ownership records were inconsistent with administrative databases. Consequently, proposal approval depended not only on legal ownership but also on administrative compatibility across multiple government institutions.

These findings extend previous research by Petri et al. (2024), demonstrating that land legality should be understood as an institutional governance issue rather than merely a legal requirement. The effectiveness of collaborative governance therefore depends on the ability of participating agencies to harmonise administrative verification procedures.

Administrative Data Integration

The study also identified administrative integration as a major determinant of proposal approval. Multiple respondents indicated that inconsistencies between the Simluhtan database, population administration, and cooperative records generated repeated proposal revisions.

Figure 6. Administrative Verification Flow of the Partnership-Based PSR Proposal

Table 5. Administrative Integration Problems

Administrative Component	Identified Issue	Consequence
Simluhtan	Data mismatch	Proposal revision
Population Database	Identity inconsistency	Verification delay
Cooperative Database	Incomplete updates	Administrative correction
Land Database	Different parcel coding	Re-verification

The findings indicate that proposal delays were caused not only by incomplete documents but also by the lack of interoperability among government information systems. These findings support Emerson and Nabatchi (2015), who argued that collaborative governance requires integrated institutional capacity rather than isolated organisational performance.

Institutional Capacity

Institutional capacity represented another critical factor influencing proposal success. Interviews demonstrated that cooperative administrators experienced difficulties in preparing administrative documents according to evolving regulatory requirements.

Table 6. Institutional Capacity Assessment

Dimension	Findings
Human resources	Limited administrative expertise
Digital capability	Low utilisation of digital systems
Document management	Manual administration
Organisational learning	Limited technical training

The findings suggest that institutional strengthening should accompany financial support. Administrative competence, organisational learning, and digital capability collectively determine the effectiveness of proposal preparation. These findings corroborate UNDP (2009), which emphasises institutional capacity as a prerequisite for successful public programme implementation.

An Integrated Governance Model For Partnership-Based PSR Funding Applications

The findings indicate that the governance challenges encountered during the PSR funding application process should not be interpreted as isolated administrative problems. Rather, the evidence demonstrates that proposal stagnation results from the interaction among five interdependent governance dimensions, namely land legality, administrative data integration, document readiness, institutional capacity, and multi-actor coordination.

These governance dimensions collectively determine whether a funding proposal proceeds efficiently through the verification process or enters repeated administrative revisions. The study found that weaknesses in one governance dimension frequently trigger problems in other dimensions, creating a cumulative governance failure that delays programme implementation.

For example, incomplete land legality generates inconsistencies during administrative verification. These inconsistencies require repeated document revisions by the cooperative, increasing administrative workload while simultaneously extending verification time among government agencies. As proposal revisions accumulate, institutional coordination becomes increasingly inefficient, ultimately creating a repetitive verification cycle.

This interaction suggests that governance failure within the PSR programme is systemic rather than procedural. Consequently, improving programme implementation requires strengthening governance integration rather than merely simplifying administrative requirements.

Unlike previous studies that primarily emphasised land legality or institutional collaboration individually (Petri et al., 2024; Hutasuhut et al., 2023), the present study demonstrates that governance dimensions interact dynamically throughout the proposal verification process. This interaction explains why proposals frequently experience repeated revisions despite fulfilling most technical requirements.

Furthermore, the findings indicate that governance effectiveness depends upon administrative integration among participating institutions. Weak interoperability among land administration systems, agricultural databases, cooperative records, and population databases significantly increases verification complexity.

These findings support the collaborative governance perspective proposed by Ansell and Gash (2008), who argue that successful public policy implementation requires institutional collaboration rather than independent organisational performance. Similarly, Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) emphasise that collaborative governance relies on the collective capacity of institutions to coordinate resources, information, and decision-making processes.

The Psr Resubmission Cycle: A Governance Perspective

One of the most significant findings of this study is the identification of a repetitive governance mechanism referred to as the PSR Resubmission Cycle. Unlike previous studies, which generally describe proposal revisions as isolated administrative events, this research demonstrates that repeated revisions constitute a systematic governance phenomenon.

The Resubmission Cycle begins when proposal verification identifies deficiencies in legal or administrative documentation. Rather than resolving governance problems immediately, proposal correction often generates additional verification requirements involving other institutions. Consequently, proposals repeatedly move back and forth among cooperatives, government agencies, and supporting institutions before reaching final approval.

The existence of this repetitive governance cycle substantially increases administrative burden for both farmers and implementing institutions. From the perspective of Administrative Burden Theory (Moynihan et al., 2015), repeated verification increases learning costs, compliance costs, and psychological costs, thereby reducing programme accessibility despite the availability of financial assistance.

Similarly, Policy Implementation Theory (Edwards III, 1980) suggests that ineffective communication, bureaucratic fragmentation, and limited institutional resources collectively reduce implementation effectiveness. The present findings extend this theory by demonstrating that governance fragmentation creates cumulative verification loops rather than isolated implementation failures.

Table 7. Comparison Between Previous Studies and the Present Study

Previous Studies	Main Focus	Principal Findings	Contribution of This Study
Ansell & Gash (2008)	Collaborative Governance	Institutional collaboration	Applies collaborative governance to PSR funding applications
Halimatussadiah et al. (2020)	PSR implementation	Coordination challenges	Explains governance interactions throughout proposal verification
Hutasuhut et al. (2023)	Partnership arrangements	Company–farmer collaboration	Integrates partnership into broader governance dimensions
Petri et al. (2024)	Land legality	Legal constraints	Demonstrates interaction between legality and administrative integration
This Study	Integrated governance	PSR Resubmission Cycle	Proposes an integrated governance model explaining proposal stagnation

Practical Implications

The findings provide several practical implications for improving the implementation of the partnership-based PSR programme.

First, the government should establish an integrated digital verification platform linking Simluhtan, ATR/BPN, civil registration databases, and cooperative administrative systems to reduce document inconsistencies.

Second, institutional capacity-building programmes should be provided for cooperative administrators to improve document preparation, digital literacy, and administrative management.

Third, regulatory harmonisation among implementing institutions is necessary to minimise overlapping verification procedures and reduce administrative burden experienced by smallholders.

Finally, governance performance should be evaluated based on the efficiency of inter-organisational coordination rather than solely on administrative compliance. Strengthening collaborative governance is expected to improve funding accessibility and accelerate the implementation of Indonesia's Smallholder Oil Palm Replanting Programme.

KESIMPULAN

This study evaluated governance challenges encountered during the funding application process of Indonesia's Smallholder Oil Palm Replanting Programme (PSR) through an in-depth case study of KUD Bina Tani Sejahtera, West Bangka Regency. The findings demonstrate that proposal stagnation cannot be explained solely by incomplete administrative documents. Instead, the funding application process is influenced by the interaction of five interconnected governance dimensions, namely land legality, administrative data integration, document readiness, institutional capacity, and multi-actor coordination.

Among these dimensions, land legality emerged as the most critical governance constraint because deficiencies in legal and administrative documentation triggered repeated verification procedures involving multiple institutions. In addition, inconsistencies among government databases, limited institutional capacity of the cooperative, and fragmented inter-agency coordination collectively contributed to prolonged proposal verification and repeated administrative revisions.

This study further demonstrates that governance failures within the partnership-based PSR programme are systemic rather than procedural. Weaknesses occurring in one governance dimension frequently generate subsequent problems in other dimensions, resulting in cumulative implementation delays. Consequently, improving programme effectiveness requires strengthening governance integration instead of merely simplifying administrative requirements.

The principal theoretical contribution of this research is the development of an Integrated Governance Model for Partnership-Based PSR Funding Applications, which combines Collaborative Governance Theory (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015), Policy Implementation Theory (Edwards III, 1980; Grindle, 1980), Administrative Burden Theory (Moynihan et al., 2015), and Institutional Capacity Theory (UNDP, 2009). Unlike previous studies that examined governance variables separately, this study explains how these governance dimensions interact throughout the proposal verification process.

Another important contribution is the introduction of the PSR Resubmission Cycle, a governance concept describing repetitive proposal revisions generated by fragmented institutional verification. This concept extends the Administrative Burden Theory by demonstrating how repeated bureaucratic verification increases compliance costs, delays programme implementation, and reduces accessibility of public funding for smallholder farmers.

From a practical perspective, the findings suggest that improving the effectiveness of the PSR programme requires integrated digital verification systems, harmonised regulations among implementing agencies, strengthened administrative capacity within farmer cooperatives, and more effective collaborative governance among public institutions and private partners. These measures are expected to reduce administrative burden, shorten proposal processing time, and improve accessibility of public funding for eligible smallholders.

This study is limited to a single partnership-based cooperative in West Bangka Regency. Although the findings provide rich insights into governance dynamics, they cannot be generalised to all PSR implementation contexts in Indonesia. Future research is therefore encouraged to examine multiple case studies across different provinces or employ mixed-method approaches to validate the proposed governance model under broader institutional settings.

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Conflict Of Interest

The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest regarding the publication of this article.

Data Availability Statement

The qualitative data supporting the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request. Some interview materials are not publicly available to protect the confidentiality of research participants.

Ethical Statement

This study was conducted in accordance with ethical principles governing qualitative research. All participants voluntarily agreed to participate after receiving an explanation of the research objectives. Personal identities have been anonymised to ensure confidentiality and privacy.

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